Attacking Atmel's CryptoMemory EEPROM with Special-Purpose Hardware

Alexander Wild, Tim Güneysu, Amir Moradi

Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 11th International Conference, ACNS 2013, Banff, AB, Canada, June 25-28, 2013


Abstract

Atmel's CryptoMemory devices are non-volatile memories with cryptographically secured access control. Recently, the authentication mechanism of these devices have been shown to be severely vulnerable. More precisely, to recover the secret key the published attack requires only two to six days of computation on a cluster involving 200 CPU cores. In this work, we identi ed and applied theoretical improvements to this attack and mapped it to a recon gurable computing cluster, known as RIVYERA. Our solution provides signi cantly higher performance exceeding the previous implementation by a factor of 7:27, revealing the secret key obtained from the internal state in 0:55 days on average using only 30 authentication frames.

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